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Trinity Private Investigators Specialize in Louisiana Child Custody Matters
TEN STEPS TO HELP WITH YOUR CHILD CUSTODY CASE
Custody
Factors La. C.C. Art. 134 You
should know the custody factors upon which your judge places specific
emphasis. There is a truism that says "knowing the judge is better than
knowing the law." Therefore, it behooves an attorney to know what a specific
judge wants in the way of testimony and evidence. However, the judge
shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the
child. It is clear that the court's decision has to be based on these or other
factors otherwise it is legal error. See Bergeron
v. Clark, 832
So.2d 327,
2002-493 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002). The factors provided by the Civil Code
are: Factor
#1: The love,
affection, and other emotional ties between each party and
the child. This
factor often ties into Factor #12, prior responsibility for care
of child. Evidence and testimony regarding the child's relationship to
your client should be presented. Witnesses can testify as
to the character and quality of the interaction between the child and
the parent based upon their personal observations. Review La. C.E.
Art. 701 regarding opinion testimony by lay witnesses. Factor
#2: The
capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection,
and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child. Testimony
by teachers can be very helpful to your case. Also, our
society values regular church attendance. If a party is active in his
church, this information should be presented to the court, particularly, if
the child is also involved in church activities. Once again,
know your judge. Church attendance may be more important to
some judges than others. Factor
#3: The
capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care and other material needs. Our
courts, as a general rule, do not decide custody based on a
parent's wealth. Boyd
v. Boyd, 647
So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994)
(one parent's greater material wealth and better home is not a
factor for consideration where the other home is adequate); Page v.
Page, 673 So.
2d 1317 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996). However, if a parent
spends his available income on himself or frivolously at the expense
of meeting the children's needs, this information should be presented
to the court. Most judges are swayed by prompt and adequate medical
treatment and care provided to a child - especially a child
who has special medical needs. Factor
#4: The length
of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and
the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment. Lee
v. Lee, 766 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000); Roberie v. Roberie,
749 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999). Factor
#5: The
permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes. These
factors relate to the desire for stability and continuity in a
child's living environment. Thus, evidence regarding the length of
time the child has been in one place, accessibility to extended family
members, and the quality and safety of the child's neighborhood are
important to a custody case. A parent with a revolving door
of significant others will be disadvantaged. Also, a parent's frequent
moves that disrupt the child's education and social life should
be brought out. Ask your client how long he has lived at his current
address and where he has lived over the previous two years. Inquire
about the residence(s) of the opposing party. Most judges will
have concerns about a parent that has been moving from place to
place. Factor
#6: The moral
fitness of each party insofar as it affects the welfare of
the child. When
evaluating the moral fitness of the parents, the primary consideration
is the child's welfare. Thus, our courts have upheld custody
awards to a mother whose past adulterous behavior did not have
a detrimental effect on the children. Cleeton
v. Cleeton,
383 So. 2d
1231 (La.1980); Lake
v. Robertson,
452 So.2d 376 (La.App. 3rd Cir.
1984). This also holds true for continuing immorality that does not
harm the child. Thus, the focus is on the detrimental effect of the
parent's illicit relationship. See Montgomery
v. Marcental,
591 So.
2d 1272 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1991); Patton
v. Patton, 457
So. 2d 321
(La. App. 2nd Cir. 1984). An award of custody is not a tool to regulate
human behavior. Its only object is the best interest of the child.
Scott v.
Scott, 665 So.
2d 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995). Also, see
the following cases for guidance: Peyton
v. Peyton, 457
So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1984) which
involved a gay parent. In this case, the court determined that there
are four factors to consider in a sexual lifestyle case: •
Is the child aware of the relationship? •
Has sex play occurred in the child's presence? •
Is the sexual conduct notorious, bringing embarrassment to the
child? •
What effect has the conduct had on family home life? In
Montgomery
v. Marcantel,
591 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
1991), the court stated: "The moral fitness of the parties is only one
of the eleven factors to be considered…A parent's actions and attitudes
toward sex outside of the marriage are but one aspect of moral
fitness." Noting that the girlfriend had no negative impact on the
child and was an accepted member of the family, the court continued, "We
recognize that in today's society, conduct which would once
have been scandalous is acceptable or perhaps even the norm…We
are no longer willing to speculate on such matters." The bottom
line is that our courts are unwilling to use a custody award to
regulate the parents' behavior. For a contrary rule, see Lozes v. Lozes,
542 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Crowson
v. Crowson, 742
So.2d 107 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1999) (extramarital affair is relevant evidence
to determine best interest, but not material change of circumstances);
Scott v.
Scott, 665 So.
2d 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995)(
primary custody to a gay parent living with her partner rarely
in child's best interest); Weaver
v. Weaver, 824
So. 2d 438 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 2002) Factor
# 7: The
mental and physical health of each party. La.
R.S. 9:331 provides that for good cause shown, the court may
order mental health evaluations of the parties, the child, or all of
the family to be conducted by a qualified mental health care provider
selected by the parties or the court. In Matthews v. Matthews,
633 So.2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), the trial court was
reversed for denying joint custody based solely on the opinion of
a single doctor. The court may assess the costs of the evaluations as
it determines is equitable (see endnote 12). La. R. S. 9:331.1
provides that for good cause shown, after a hearing, a party may
be ordered to submit to drug testing. Factor
# 8: The
home, school, and community history of the child. Evidence
and testimony regarding the child's involvement in school
and extracurricular activities can be relevant to the issue of custody.
For example, the circle of friends whom the child may have;
the activities in which the child has participated; clubs of which
the child is a member, exhibit to the court the child's connection to
his current custodial placement. A failure to involve the child
in age and gender appropriate activities can be used against a parent.
Most judges are swayed by how the child is doing in school and
which parent is responsible for the performance. Factor
# 9: The
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express a preference. Perhaps,
the least persuasive Art. 134 custody factor, particularly, when
the child is under 14 years of age, is the child's preference. Courts
take notice of the fact that the parent who can promise
the children the most things often secures the children's preference.
Thus, unless the child is a teenager, who expresses a distinct
preference and the court can evaluate the basis for such preference,
this factor is not given much probative value. The jurisprudence
has held that a child's preference alone is insufficient to
change custody. Perkins
v. Perkins,
747 So.2d 785, 790 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1999), writ
recalled as improvidently granted,
758 So.2d 141 (La.
2000); Montelone
v. Montelone,
591 So.2d 1228, 1235 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1991). Often,
a parent will be convinced that the children's preference will
determine the outcome of the case. Consequently, parents begin an
emotional tug of war with the children in the middle. It is up to FAMILY
LAW (290) the
attorney to provide sound legal guidance in such situations. Thus,
an attorney should think long and hard before hauling the children
up to the courthouse and placing them in the middle of an emotionally
charged, hotly contested custody dispute. Be absolutely
sure that there is extremely good cause to do so. If such a
decision is made, have the children situated away from the courthouse on
standby until such time as their testimony is required. A person's
age alone, is not the test of whether that person shall be allowed
to appear and present testimony. Rather, the test is whether
that person has "proper understanding." Whether the minor
child has proper understanding, such that he will be allowed to
testify, is a matter within the trial judge's discretion. State v. Sharp,
338 So. 2d 654 (La. 1976). Refer
to Watermeier
v. Watermeier,
462 So.2d 1272 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1985) for the procedure that should be followed when a court
interviews children. Many judges simply do not want to talk to
the children. Thus, it is wise to discuss your plan to present minor
children as witnesses with the court (with opposing counsel present,
of course). Factor
# 10: The
willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing relationship between the child and
the other party. To
many judges, this factor is of tremendous importance in determining
the proper custodial placement of children. In fact, some
judges have modified custody primarily due to the misconduct of
the custodial parent and his attempt to undermine the child's love
and affection for the non-custodial parent. Our courts consider that
changing custody from a non-cooperative, disruptive custodial parent
to a blameless non-custodial parent can most surely be in the
child's best interest. This
factor presents the opportunity for counsel to discuss with
his client the importance of co-parenting. Referring your client
to a cooperative parenting program contemporaneously with or
shortly after instituting an original custody action may provide you
with a strategic advantage. Certainly, the information provided to
your client through such a program can be helpful to the family and
to your successful management of the case. At the very least, your
client will be perceived by the court as positive and proactive. Cases
which discuss those problems arising when parties fail to
cooperate include: Bergeron
v. Bergeron,
supra. Turner
v. Turner,
supra. Yelverton
v. Yelverton,
621 So.2d 36 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1993) Hendrick
v. Hendrick,
660 So.2d 99 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1995) Goodwin
v. Goodwin,
618 So.2d 579 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1993) Larsen
v. Polk, 841
So. 2d 992 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003) Factor
# 11: The
distance between the respective residences of the parties. In
Stewart
v. Stewart,
525 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) the
court commented, While
a great distance between the parents is not an absolute bar
to joint custody, in this case the distance coupled with the animosity between
the parties is sufficient to rebut the presumption that
joint custody is in the best interest of the child. See Eiswirth v.
Eiswirth, 500
So. 2d 817 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ
denied 502 So.
2d 111 (La. 1987). Stewart
was decided
prior to the 1994 revision of La. C.C. Art. 133
which eliminated the presumption of joint custody. See also Lachney
v. Lachney,
446 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984) wherein
the court concluded that a joint custody arrangement was unworkable
insofar as one party resided in South Carolina and the other
in Louisiana. Factor
# 12: The
responsibility for care and rearing of the child previously exercised
by each party. This
factor was added in 1994 to recognize what attorneys previously had
always stressed in their case, that is, who has been the primary
caretaker of the child. Thus, when meeting with your client,
you should be concerned with your client's history of caring for
the child. In this regard, one should inquire as to who has been primarily
responsible for such day to day activities as changing diapers,
preparing meals, washing clothes, obtaining immunizations and
medical and dental care, transporting the child to and from
activities, disciplining the child, getting the child ready for bed,
providing assistance with homework, etc. This has always been
a very important consideration, despite being initially omitted from
Article 134. The
importance placed upon the "primary" parent by our courts
and legislature has been criticized. Psychologist, R.A. Thompson,
observed: Basic
maintenance tasks like meal preparation, dressing, bathing,
and chauffeuring can be readily assumed by either parent regardless
of the level of his or her predivorce responsibility for these
concerns. Many of these responsibilities are activities done for
the child rather than with the child. The focus of a custody inquiry
should properly be the meaning and significance of each parent's
relationship with the child. R.A. Thompson, The Role of the
Father After Divorce, The Future of Children, 4, 210-35 (1994). Such
critics contend that the emphasis on the primary caretaker: Ignores
the quality of the relationship between the child and the
primary caretaker in favor of counting hours and rewarding many
repetitive, concrete behaviors. Further in accordance with this
line of thinking, critics contend that the most important emo- tional
and interactive behaviors promoting children's development and
psychological, social, and academic adjustment, such as love, acceptance,
respect, encouragement of autonomy, learning, and self-esteem,
moral guidance, and absence of abusive interactions are
not considered. Kelly, J.B., The Determination of Child Custody, The
Future of Children, 4, 121-42 (1994).
Quick resources on Child Custody: Louisiana Child Custody Forum:
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